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Citizenship and State-building in Contemporary Bolivia;  
Politization of Cultural Identity  
 
 
Vibeke Andersson, Aalborg University  
&  
Håvard Haarstad, University of Bergen 
 
Introduction  
Bolivia is frequently cited as an example of a Latin American backlash against 
the neoliberal reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. The election of Evo Morales in 
the wake of popular mobilization around issues of privatization, gas and 
indigenous rights has widely been seen as a radical break from neoliberalism 
and a return to a radical agenda. Morales’ announcement of nationalization in 
2006 was highly symbolic of this, taking place on the international day of labor 
May 1st, with the presence of military troops at the foreign-owned gas fields, and 
the issuance of a decree that emphasized historical links to nationalizations in 
1937 and 1969. In the narrative of a current backlash, events like these and 
popular mobilization in general are seen as effects of the negative consequences 
of neoliberal reforms. Neoliberalism tends to be understood as a destructive 
force centered on privatization, causing unemployment and inequality, and often 
provoking backlashes in the form of popular mobilization.  
 
This paper aims to reconsider the backlash narrative by presenting an alternative 
narrative of the relationship between neoliberal reform and popular mobilization 
in Bolivia. At one level, it could be argued that the current agenda is not as 
radical as it is often presented. At the announcement of Bolivian gas 
nationalization, military troops were withdrawn as soon as journalists’ cameras 
had left.1 The current government continues to seek foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and cooperation with foreign companies. But the argument that we are 
pursuing is rather that the backlash narrative should be reconsidered because 
there are important continuities and mutual constraints between popular 
mobilization and neoliberal policy. Popular mobilization in Bolivia is in 
important ways interlinked with new political spaces opened up by neoliberal 
reforms, while neoliberal policy discourses have been constrained by concerns 
for political stability. The identity based recognition that was implemented 
through neoliberal discourses had been demanded through growing indigenous 
mobilization. These reforms sought to achieve social and political integration on 
the basis of cultural identities in order to replace corporatist modes of social and 
political integration of entire sectors on the basis of class. Understood in this 
                                                          
1  The Democracy Center, 'Interpreting Bolivia's Political Transformation' (Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, 2007), pp. 185-6. 
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context, political mobilization in Bolivia is in significant ways interrelated with 
the neoliberal project of politicizing cultural identity. In the contemporary 
period, there are mutual constraints between popular mobilization and neoliberal 
policymaking.   
 
In pursuing this argument we contribute to a growing body of literature on what 
we have here called “constructive” neoliberalism, which focuses on neoliberal 
reforms of citizenship, decentralization and governance. It has been pointed out 
that the character of neoliberalism has shifted towards “purposeful construction 
and consolidation”.2 There is an increasing recognition of the aspects of 
neoliberal reforms that concern the social infrastructure underpinning economic 
markets. New regimes of citizenship, multicultural identity and decentralization 
can in this perspective be understood as attempts to create the conditions for 
political stability necessary to foster a proper climate for FDI. Postero has 
advanced a particularly convincing analysis of how neoliberal decentralization 
and citizenship reforms in Bolivia sought to create economically rational 
subjects and responsible behavior at the local level.3  
 
However, there is a need to further explore how “constructive” neoliberalism 
has shaped, and been shaped by, the political landscape of Bolivia. Rather than 
understanding the relation between neoliberal policy and popular mobilization 
as a radical rupture, we seek to emphasize how popular mobilization has been 
shaped by the political spaces of neoliberal reform, and how popular 
mobilization has constrained neoliberal policy. After a brief discussion of two 
currents of writing that we call “reductive” and “constructive” neoliberalism, 
and the neoliberal rationale behind social integration based on cultural identity, 
we outline our narrative that stresses continuities between neoliberal reforms 
and popular mobilization in Bolivia. This part of the paper is divided into three 
sections. First we outline the integration regime of the revolution era, which 
politicized class subject and largely maintained the marginalization of 
indigenous identities. Second, by focusing primarily on decentralization and 
popular participation reforms, we look at how this regime was replaced by a 
“constructive” neoliberal project of integration politicizing cultural identity. 
Third, we show how neoliberal policymaking and popular mobilization have 
been mutually influenced and constrained in the era after the 2003 political 
instability.  
 
The empirical data for this paper draws on repeated field work in Bolivia since 
1998, most recently until February 2007. The authors have individually 
                                                          
2   Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Neoliberalizing Space', in Brenner and Theodore (eds.), 
Spaces of Neoliberalism (Malden, 2003). 
3   Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural 
Bolivia (Stanford, 2007). 
 3
collected data on reforms, implementation and policy discourse that in various 
ways pertain to the broader argument. The empirics on gradual integration of 
indigenous groups at the local level were collected through a longer field work 
period in a municipality of the Potosí department. The primary method of field 
work in Potosí was participant observation during meetings in the municipal 
government and at meetings in the communities, and interviews conducted at all 
levels in the municipality and the communities. We also draw briefly on 
interviews with labor union leaders, social movement activists and public 
officials conduced as part of a field work period in La Paz, Cochabamba and 
Santa Cruz in 2006 and 2007. Data on the IMF policy discourse were collected 
at the IMF Archives in Washington, DC. The documents that were investigated 
cover the period from the start of structural adjustment in 1985 to 2006, and 
include all documents relating to Bolivia that have been made accessible 
through the Archive in October 2006. These were analyzed by focusing on the 
construction of the role of FDI in economic development, as part of a broader 
effort to understand the shifting phases of the investment climate discourse. The 
varied sources of data are in the present context analyzed to shed light upon the 
way in which decentralization and popular participation reforms and the 
investment climate discourse create spaces for political mobilization. They 
enable us to be attentive, we would argue, to localized processes of political 
inclusion on one hand, and the institutional discourses of the IMF on the other. 
 
 
“Reductive” and “constructive” neoliberalism 
The term neoliberalism has been applied for a broad range of policy reforms that 
promote the role of economic rationality and the market in the governance of 
society.4 We will outline what we see as two main currents of theorizing, which 
we will call “reductive” and “constructive”. Within the “reductive” current, 
neoliberalism is generally understood as an all-encompassing macroeconomic 
and state transformation that causes social and economic hardships, sparking 
reactions in the form of “cycles of resistance”.5 These analyses of neoliberal 
reforms have typically pointed to the gap between economic liberalization and 
social concerns, such as lack of individual access to political influence, 
education, health care and basic necessities. These accounts emphasize how 
economic reforms are imposed through lopsided institutional and economic 
power relations, how the reforms create polarized structures of distribution, and 
how popular mobilization comes as a reaction to the dispossession brought by 
                                                          
4   Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing, Impasse in Bolivia. Neoliberal hegemony and 
popular resistance (London, 2006). 
5   Duncan Green, Silent Revolution: The Rise and Crisis of Market Economics in Latin 
America (New York, 2003); José Seoane, 'Movimientos Sociales y Recursos Naturales 
en América Latina: resistencias al neoliberalismo, configuración de alternativas', 
Sociedade e Estado, vol. 21, no.1 (2006), pp. 85-107. 
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neoliberal reform. Keeling argues that neoliberal reforms have not addressed 
social concerns because “policy priorities have been macroeconomic in nature 
and not geared toward addressing poverty, inequality, or the redistribution of 
access to skills, capital and global opportunities”.6 These critiques stress 
pronounced inequality, low growth, volatility and unequal development 
resulting from neoliberal reform.7 We call this approach “reductive” because 
writings tend to focus on how structural adjustment reduces the ability of the 
state to implement social and redistributive policies. 8 
 
On Bolivia, many accounts have centered on the role of IMF in imposing 
socially disastrous structural adjustments, consequences of neoliberal reform on 
small level agricultural production, regional differences in embracing or 
opposing a neoliberal economy, and how recent social upheaval has “dealt an 
inspiring blow […] to the neoliberal order”.9 With regard to social movements, 
indigenous peoples’ fight for rights and poor people’s livelihoods in Latin 
American countries, the politics of neoliberalism is often seen as enemy number 
one.10 Within the framework of “reductive” neoliberalism, the dominant policy 
orientation is seen to be in line with the interests of multinational corporations, 
foreign investors, national elites, or the subordination of local development to 
the national integration in the global economy. It often follows, within this 
framework, that expulsion of multinational corporations represents a strategy for 
the empowerment of locally based development and identities. It is this 
                                                          
6   David Keeling, 'Latin American Development and the Globalization Imperative: New 
Directions, Familiar Crises', Journal of Latin American Geography, vol. 3, no.1 (2004), 
pp. 1-21. 
7   Richard L. Harris, 'The Global Context of Contemporary Latin American Affairs', in 
Halebsky and Harris (eds.), Capital, Power and Inequality in Latin America (Boulder, 
1995); Kurt Weyland, 'Assessing Latin American Neoliberalism: Introduction to a 
debate', Latin American Research Review, vol. 39, no.3 (2004), pp. 143-9. 
8   We do not intend to attach normative evaluations to the terms “reductive” and 
“constructive”. 
9   Carlos Arze and Tom Kruse, 'The Consequences of Neoliberal Reform', NACLA Report 
on the Americas, vol. 38, no.3 (2004), pp. 23-30; NACLA, 'Bolivia Fights Back' (New 
York, 2004); June Nash, 'Interpreting Social Movements: Bolivian Resistance to 
Economic Conditions Imposed by the International Monetary Fund', American 
Ethnologist, vol. 19, no.2 (1992), pp. 275-93; Kathleen Schroeder, 'Economic 
Globalization and Bolivia's Regional Divide', Journal of Latin American Geography, 
vol. 6, no.2 (2007), pp. 99-120. 
10   Thomas Perreault, 'From the Guerra del Agua to the Guerra del Gas: Resource 
Governance, Neoliberalism and Popular Protest in Bolivia', Antipode, vol. 38, no.1 
(2006), pp. 150-72; James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Dynamics of Social Change in 
Latin America (New York, 2003); Jim Shultz, 'Promises to Keep: Using Public Budgets 
as a Tool to Advance Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (Cuernavaca, 2002); Jim 
Shultz, 'The Politics of Water in Bolivia', The Nation (28 January 2005). 
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understanding of contemporary Bolivia as in a state of uproar against 
neoliberalism we call the backlash narrative. 
 
Parallel to this current, a body of literature has emerged arguing that neoliberal 
reforms should not primarily be conceived as structural adjustment, but a 
broader project which aims at creating particular types institutions and a social 
infrastructure that facilitates integration into markets. Analyses of these policies 
have been particularly concerned with constructions of identities, citizenship and 
local governance. It has been noted that neoliberal reform sometimes overlaps 
with the (ostensibly very different) principles of sustainable development, 
including democratic empowerment, environmental conservation and social 
justice.11 To Perreault and Martin, “the environment, culture, and identity have 
emerged as key neoliberal frontiers.”12 Peck and Tickell argue that the character 
of neoliberalism has changed towards a focus on “the purposeful construction 
and consolidation of neoliberal state forms.”13 Laurie and Bonnett argue that an 
element within neoliberalism fosters new forms of social engineering that can 
facilitate the creation of an efficient and harmonious capitalist society.14 In other 
words, neoliberalism is increasingly understood in relation to the social 
infrastructural underpinning of well functioning markets and efficient economic 
activity. We call this current “constructive” neoliberalism because it primarily 
focuses on the strengthening of the ability of state institutions to make markets 
function efficiently.  
 
Several accounts of neoliberal reform in Bolivia apply this broader notion of 
neoliberalism in analyses of the programs and policies of the 1990s. Andolina, 
Radcliffe and Laurie argued that the Bolivian state redefined its national identity 
as a “multicultural state” to comply with a neoliberal citizenship regime, which 
provided specific subject categories within which indigenous people were to be 
represented.15 McNeish labels this a “reinvention of the Andean tradition”, in a 
case study of how a highland Bolivian community became locked into 
negotiation concerning their identity and development aspirations with the 
                                                          
11   Mike Raco, 'Sustainable Development, Rolled-out Neoliberalism and Sustainable   
Communities', Antipode, vol. 37, no.2 (2005), pp. 324-47. 
12   Thomas Perrault and Patricia Martin, 'Geographies of Neoliberalism in Latin America', 
Environment and Planning A, vol. 37, no.2 (2005), pp. 191-201. 
13   Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, 'Neoliberalizing Space', in Brenner and Theodore (eds.), 
Spaces of Neoliberalism (Malden, 2003), pp. 37. 
14   Nina Laurie and Alastair Bonnett, 'Adjusting to Equity: The Contradictions of 
Neoliberalism and the Search for Racial Equity in Peru', Antipode, vol. 34, no.1 (2002), 
pp. 28-53. 
15   Robert Andolina, Sarah Radcliffe and Nina Laurie, 'Development and culture: 
Transnational identity making in Bolivia', Political Geography, vol. 24, (2005), pp. 678-
702. 
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national state and international financial institutions.16 It has also been argued 
that decentralization policies serve to establish new regimes of control that seek 
to create the political stability necessary for attracting foreign investment.17 
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of governmentality, Postero sees Bolivian 
decentralization reforms as part of a neoliberal regime of indigenous citizenship 
that “interpellated indigenous people as citizens” and aimed to foster responsible 
subjects for a neoliberal economy.18 The decentralization reforms opened spaces 
for political participation, but in practice, participation within these spaces is 
dependent on a certain kind of rational behavior. She shows how NGOs funded, 
trained and reinforced certain capabilities among the indigenous people, to assist 
them in conforming to notions of “good” citizenship in neoliberal 
multiculturalism.  
 
In a reading of contemporary Bolivian society it is certainly possible to find 
some support for a narrative of “reductive” neoliberal policies and a 
contemporary backlash against them. The New Economic Policy implemented 
in 1985 made, by some accounts, more than 30,000 workers redundant. State 
enterprises were privatized during the 1990s in compliance with demands of the 
World Bank and the IMF. Later Bolivia has experienced a resurgence of a 
revolutionary, anti-neoliberal rhetoric, a left-wing president and government 
with focus on “taking back rights” from the parties and the established elite. 
Formal relations with the IMF have been scaled back significantly and Bolivia is 
no longer subject to its conditionalities.  
 
However, seen against the backdrop of a project of “constructive” neoliberalism, 
it is possible to construct a viable and more accurate narrative of the relationship 
between neoliberal reform and the current mobilization of indigenous groups. 
Recent reforms and policy discourses in Bolivia can be thought of as a 
“constructive” neoliberal project that politicizes cultural identity in the process 
of creating a social infrastructure for private economic activity. Popular 
mobilization can be understood, not just as a reaction to dispossession (see for 
example Seoane), but in the context of new political spaces that were created in 
order to integrate citizens on the basis of cultural identity.19 These spaces for 
popular mobilization emerged alongside attempts to foster the type of 
                                                          
16   John McNeish, 'Globalization and the Reinvention of Andean Tradition: The Politics of 
Community and Ethnicity in Highland Bolivia ', Journal of Peasant Studies, vol. 29, 
no.3-4 (2002), pp. 228-69. 
17   Benjamin Kohl, 'Stabilizing neoliberalism in Bolivia: popular participation and 
privatization', Political Geography, vol. 21, (2002), pp. 449-72. 
18   Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural 
Bolivia (Stanford, 2007). 
19   José Seoane, 'Movimientos Sociales y Recursos Naturales en América Latina: 
resistencias al neoliberalismo, configuración de alternativas', Sociedade e Estado, vol. 
21, no.1 (2006), pp. 85-107. 
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economically rational and politically stable society necessary for a proper 
investment climate. But also, the “constructive” neoliberal concern for a 
politically stable investment climate commits policy implementation to a 
consensus building that can at times require giving concessions to social 
movements.  
 
 
Politization of identity and the neoliberal rationale 
The “constructive” neoliberal rationale of creating the political stability needed 
for a proper investment climate has shifted policy away from structural 
adjustment and towards projects of socio-economic integration. There seems to 
be an increasing recognition in neoliberal development discourses that economic 
development is dependent on socially and politically integrated citizens. 
According to the World Bank, the investment climate perspective puts firms, the 
actors making investment decisions, at the heart of the development process.20 
But it is the role of governments to foster a skilled workforce and human capital, 
encourage stability and security, build local government capacities, and establish 
credibility, public trust and legitimacy. To Craig and Porter, governments and 
agencies of various stripes are now “focusing on optimizing economic, juridical 
and social governance in order to create ideal conditions for international 
finance and investment.”21  
 
This policy discourse rests on constructions of what constitutes a healthy 
economy, and seeks to integrate citizens and develop their capacities to 
participate economically. But it entails a particular type of integration and 
capacity building, one that replaces the class based integration of past 
corporatist, import substitution industrialization regimes.22 It seeks to establish a 
framework for social integration that is more conducive to an efficient, private 
sector-based and internationally oriented economy. While corporatist models 
sought to encourage social stability by collectively organizing society to 
neutralize potentially contradictory class interests, social stability is now sought 
by allowing political articulations based on cultural identity.23 Identity based 
                                                          
20   World Bank, 'World Development Report 2005' (New York, 2005). 
21   David Craig and Doug Porter, 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New 
Convergence', World Development, vol. 31, no.1 (2003), pp. 53-69, 54. 
22   Philip Oxhorn, 'Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of 
Neopopulism', in Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (eds.), What Kind of Democracy? What 
Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism (Pennsylvania, 1998); 
Deborah J. Yashar, 'Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the Postliberal Challenge 
in Latin America', World Politics, vol. 52, no.1 (1999), pp. 76-104. 
23   Philip Oxhorn, 'Is the Century of Corporatism Over? Neoliberalism and the Rise of 
Neopopulism', in Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (eds.), What Kind of Democracy? What 
Kind of Market? Latin America in the Age of Neoliberalism (Pennsylvania, 1998). 
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integration, in turn, can be considered a way of achieving social integration and 
encouraging stability without simultaneously strengthening organized labor.  
 
These reforms have been seen as attempts to govern and control indigenous 
subjects, by integrating them in governance structures and creating incentives 
for them to agitate within these structures.24 The recognition of cultural identity 
is a way of “civilizing the popular”, in the words of Mederios.25 She sees 
democratization reforms in Bolivia in the context of hegemonic processes which 
have aimed at incorporating Andean peasants into the Bolivian state. To Laurie 
and Bonnett, neoliberal educational strategies focused on racial equity have been 
designed to facilitate the harmonious coexistence of multiracial populations.26 
Postero argued that decentralization reforms encouraged the indigenous to 
mobilize their indigenous identities, but only in “authorized” ways that “reflect 
the logic of neoliberalism – transparency, efficiency, and rational 
participation.”27  
 
Understood in this context, the strengthening of cultural identity based social 
movements in Bolivia reflects the attempt to create the social infrastructure and 
political stability needed for a proper investment climate. However, there is a 
need to investigate how the concern for a politically stable investment climate 
also constrains an institution such as the IMF. Popular mobilization can threaten 
investment climates by creating political instability, necessitating divergence 
from planned policy reforms and concessions to social movements. On the basis 
of these assumptions, it is possible to sustain a narrative that is sensitive to the 
continuities in the relationship between popular mobilization and neoliberal 
reform in Bolivia. This must begin with the social integration project that 
neoliberal reforms aimed to replace; the class based politization in the national 
revolutionary discourse.  
 
 
Revolution and the politization of class subjects 
Until the start of the first neoliberal reforms, popular mobilization in Bolivia 
was mainly articulated through a class based discourse.  The 1952 revolution in 
Bolivia brought the party Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) to 
                                                          
24   Benjamin Kohl, 'Stabilizing neoliberalism in Bolivia: popular participation and 
privatization', Political Geography, vol. 21, (2002), pp. 449-72. 
25   Carmen Mederios, 'Civilizing the Popular? The Law of Popular Participation and the 
Design of a New Civil Society in 1990s Bolivia', Critique of Anthropology, vol. 21, no.4 
(2001), pp. 401-25. 
26   Nina Laurie and Alastair Bonnett, 'Adjusting to Equity: The Contradictions of 
Neoliberalism and the Search for Racial Equity in Peru', Antipode, vol. 34, no.1 (2002), 
pp. 28-53. 
27   Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural 
Bolivia (Stanford, 2007), pp. 185-6. 
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power. The country was predominantly rural, with the majority of the population 
only marginally integrated into the national economy. The privileged subjects in 
political discourse of the revolution were the growing proletariat, the salaried 
workers in the primary industries.28 The MNR promoted a class-based political 
discourse by which it sought the inclusion of the rural indigenous, the majority 
of the population. This was achieved by forming workers and peasant unions 
and thereby linking citizenship to the state through a class-based “revolutionary 
nationalist” ideology.29 The Central Labour Federation (COB, Central Obrera 
Boliviana) was formed and given extraordinary powers, including powers to 
appoint ministers directly and veto over government decisions. The COB was 
controlled by the urban and industrial proletariat, particularly miners, and 
campesinos were de facto excluded from the executive committee.30 Throughout 
the post-revolutionary period, campesinos were by urban people and rural elites 
regarded as primitive and backwards.31 They were in effect not seen as part of 
the modern Bolivian state, but rather an obstacle to modernization. 
 
Under the land reform program, land was expropriated from the haciendas and 
redistributed according to campesino unions, in which campesinos had to be 
members in order to receive land.32 At the same time an education reform 
enhanced Spanish as common language, undermining indigenous languages. 
This linked inclusion, citizenship and ownership to land together through the 
category of class. In turn, the revolutionary discourse politicized class identities 
through the exclusion of indigenous identities. The cultural exclusion of 
indigenous identities is not a purely Bolivian phenomenon, as many Latin 
American countries have had the mono-cultural nation-state as a model for the 
modernization process.  
 
In many ways, the revolutionary form of politization only reinscribed 
discrimination of the indigenous. The revolution offered universal suffrage and 
                                                          
28   Gustavo Rodríguez and Carlos Bõhrt, Crisis del sindicalismo en Bolivia (La Paz, 1987). 
29   Winston Moore Casanovas, 'Capital Accumulation and Revolutionary Nationalism in 
Bolivia, 1952-85', in Anglade and Fortin (eds.), The State and Capital Accumulation in 
Latin America (Pittsburgh, 1985); Jimena Costa Benavides, 'La "Guerra del Gas" en 
Bolivia. Representaciones sobre neoliberalismo y el rol del Estado en la defensa de los 
recursos naturales en la crisis de octobre de 2003', in Mato (ed.) Políticas de economia, 
ambiente y sociedad en tiempos de globalización (Caracas, 2005). 
30   Guillermo Lora, A History of the Bolivian Labour Movement, 1848-1971 (Cambridge, 
1977). 
31   Riviera Silva Cusicanqui, 'Liberal Democracy and Ayllu Democracy in Bolivia: The 
Case of Northern Potosí', Journal of Development Studies, vol. 26, no.4 (1990), pp. 97-
121; Stuart Alexander Rockefeller, 'Political Institutions and the Evanescence of Power: 
Making History in Highland Bolivia', Ethnology, vol. 37, no.2 (1998), pp. 187-207; Luis 
Ergueta Antezana, Bolivia: De la Reforma a la Contra Reforma Agraria (La Paz, 1992). 
32   James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements and State Power (London, 
2005). 
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gave the indigenous the right to vote, but in effect, the indigenous were offered 
citizenship only if they abandoned their Indian identities and incorporated 
themselves into “modern” society on the basis of the cultural norms of the urban 
mestizo class.33 Even with the formal right to vote, until recently it was not 
possible for many in the rural areas to do so, since they lacked identification 
papers. Obtaining a birth certificate for example, meant that people had to travel 
to the place they were born to get the papers, which is out of financial reach of 
many of the rural poor. Low election participation in rural areas has been 
another reason behind political and economic exclusion. Bolivia remained 
“weakly integrated territory” with high levels of rural and indigenous poverty.34 
The indigenous lacked capacities and opportunities to become productive 
members of Bolivian society.  
 
During fieldwork in the Department of Potosi in 1998, indigenous 
disempowerment became evident at a meeting of the Coma municipality. Most 
often the meetings took place with only the members of the municipal council 
present, but on an October Monday a delegation from the village Huya had 
come to ask about an electrification project which should have been initiated in 
their area some time ago. The five representatives from Huya were poor 
indigenous campesinos, representing the “council of authorities” of their village. 
The villagers appeared in their daily clothes, bare feet in sandals made of old 
rubber tire and clothes that showed traces of hard work in the fields. The 
members of the municipal council, on the other hand, were town professionals 
and the social and cultural differences were highly visible. After having waited 
most of the afternoon, the representatives from Huya were allowed to enter the 
meeting. From the chairman of the council they were met with the response; 
“why do you people always show up so numerous? We will only receive one 
representative at a time.” After explaining that it is important to them that all 
should participate in the meeting, the members of the delegation were allowed to 
stay. But they were not offered chairs and had to stand throughout the meeting.  
 
The leader of the electrification committee of Huya asked the municipal council 
for permission to speak, and given this, he gave the opinion of the delegation on 
the failing electrification project. All members of the delegation asked 
permission to speak, and they all described the need for electrification and the 
consequences of the missing electricity, and asked the municipal council to 
allow for the work to start. Even though the representatives from Huya spoke 
well, they were at the same time very humble towards the municipal council, 
                                                          
33   Nancy Grey Postero, Now We Are Citizens: Indigenous Politics in Postmulticultural 
Bolivia (Stanford, 2007), pp. 41-2. 
34   Carlos M. Vilas, 'Participation, Inequality and the Whereabouts of Democracy', in 
Chalmers (ed.) The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking 
Participation and Representation (Oxford, 1997).  
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and what was intended as a complaint was very subtly presented, not to offend 
the members of the municipal council. 
 
The delegation was dismissed after almost an hour of presence, and the 
municipal council promised to do something about the situation. In the 
discussion among the members of the municipal council afterwards, the 
conclusion was that it was unfortunate with the delay of this project, but due to 
the spending of the funds this year, the project had to be postponed to the 
following year. This was however never voiced towards the delegation. They 
were dismissed with “We shall see to it as soon as possible...” It was the fifth 
time the delegation had visited the municipal council. Nothing came out of the 
request.  
 
Despite continuing structures of exclusion, indigenous organizations have 
demanded official recognition of their rights and slowly become a social force at 
the national level. In 1979 a campesino union (CSUTCB) was formed, which 
rejected subordinate ties to the COB and the state. The CSUTB partly reflected 
the union (sindicalista) orientation of the labor movement as a whole, but helped 
bring focus towards an indigenous (indigenista) agenda as well.35  From the mid-
1980s, the mining unions lost much of their influence due to the earliest 
structural adjustment programs of the IMF, which made 30,000 mining workers 
redundant according to some accounts. Throughout this decade, campesinos 
took leadership positions in COB, as they, government workers, and others 
dethroned urban miners as the vanguard of the national labor movement. The 
growing indigenous movement demanded extended rights and integration into 
state structures.  
 
What was taking place, then, was the early stage of a gradual shift away from a 
political discourse that had as its modernization and national development 
strategy to integrate all sectors as class subjects. Campesinos had increasingly 
begun to mobilize political power through their indigenous identities. There was 
a growing mobilization of this majority group in Bolivian society, as well as the 
general weakening of organized labor. These demands would to a certain degree 
be met in the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, as the “second generation” of IMF 
sanctioned reforms sought to weaken class based politization and strengthen 
integration based on cultural identity. While indigenous mobilization was 
already on the rise, these reforms would provide new spaces for this 
mobilization.  
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Neoliberalism and the politization of cultural identity    
The first generation of neoliberal restructuring in Bolivia started in 1985, with 
what was called the New Economic Policy. In these early reforms, the IMF did 
not conceive of problems in Bolivia primarily in terms of lacking social 
inclusion or integration. Instead, the structural reform program implemented at 
the time centered on what it saw as macroeconomic mismanagement of the 
public sector. The problematic situation in the country was attributed to 
“unrelenting expansion of the deficit of the nonfinancial public sector”.36 The 
measures implemented to deal with the situation were structural adjustment 
classics: reducing public sector employment, a flexible wage rate, tight fiscal 
management and increasing the role of private companies. These policies 
significantly reduced the influence of labor unions and brought an end to the 
failing state sponsored project of social integration on a class basis. The 
neoliberal reforms of the 1980s were macroeconomic in nature and did not 
immediately replace the class based social integration project with a neoliberal 
one. It is these “classical” macroeconomic measures, we would argue, that form 
the basis of the theoretization on what we have called “reductive” neoliberalism. 
By the mid-1990s a second generation of neoliberal reform was under way that 
would form the basis for cultural identity based social integration and 
mobilization.  
The IMF considered its first generation of structural reform to be hugely 
successful, but aimed to implement a second generation of structural reform to 
strengthen growth. The first generation of reforms had achieved relative 
macroeconomic stability, but growth had remained at a relatively low rate of 
around 4 percent. In policy documents from the mid-1990s, it is clear that the 
lack of social integration and of “capacities” in the rural (indigenous) population 
is considered an impediment to growth. Low growth is attributed not to 
macroeconomic instability and imprudent macroeconomic management, but low 
agricultural productivity, rural poverty, low human capital and poor 
infrastructure. “Sustained” economic growth is now seen as dependent on 
alleviation of rural poverty, social inclusion and the development of human 
resources. In the Economic Policy Framework Paper 1994 to 1997 it is stated 
that: 
 
“The Government's social sector strategy is a key element of the economic 
policy program, and is centered on the development of human capital to 
alleviate poverty and increase the capacity for sustained economic growth.” 37 
 
                                                          
36   IMF Archives, SM/85/233, Bolivia – Staff Report for the 1985 Article IV Consultation, 
8/15/85.  
37   IMF Archives, EDB/94/188, Bolivia – Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility – 
Economic and Policy Framework Paper for 1994-97, 12/1/94, pp 16. 
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This second generation of neoliberal reform, in other words, represents a 
discursive shift on what creates growth and economic development. What is 
needed for “sustained” economic growth is human capital and “capacity”, so 
lack of social integration and poor social infrastructure is now conceived as 
central to neoliberal economic strategies. This necessitates investment rather 
than disinvestment in basic public services, in order to strengthen the capacities 
of the marginalized to become productive members of society. A central part of 
this platform was a string of new reforms on decentralization and popular 
participation, land rights and education implemented in the mid-1990s.  
 
The reforms were designed and legalized under President Gonzalo Sanchez de 
Lozada, and were called The Plan for Everyone (“Plan de Todos”).  As part of 
the Plan, a range of new legislation was passed concerning education, 
privatization, constitutional reform, decentralization, local democracy and 
pensions. In broad terms, the Plan sought to recreate the relationships between 
the state, the economy and society. It was an ambitious attempt to attract foreign 
direct investments, create a more efficient administrative state structure, foster 
local participation in political and economic development, and redefine notions 
of citizenship in one broad stroke. Privatization opened opportunities for FDI, 
and various reforms centered on health, education and local capacities were to 
develop social infrastructure needed for a proper investment climate. The 
reforms catered to international financial institutions such as the IMF on one 
hand, and to middle class intellectuals and NGOs that had demanded increased 
attention towards local development and indigenous rights on the other.38 
Reforms were also a demand on the part of large segments of the indigenous 
population that had demanded increasing influence by way of popular protests, 
such as road blockades. 39 The reforms can be seen as serving the two-fold 
purpose of weakening class articulation of politics and promoting political 
stability by recognizing the demands of a growing popular mobilization among 
the indigenous.  
 
The ideal state structure was no longer one that facilitated interest mediation 
between organized sectors of society, but one that facilitated private economic 
activity and rational political participation. One piece of legislation particularly 
important for understanding this new regime of political identity formation was 
the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), passed in 1994. The law aimed to 
“correct the historical imbalance that exists between rural and urban areas”, by 
                                                          
38   Carmen Mederios, 'Civilizing the Popular? The Law of Popular Participation and the 
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transferring responsibilities for education and health, among others, to the 
municipal level.40 In one sense the law applied the classical tools of 
decentralization currently in use across Latin America and much of the rest of 
the world. 41 In addition, Bolivian decentralization also involved some 
innovative features. The LPP authorized grassroots territorial organizations 
(OTBs, Organizaciones Teritoriales de Base) to participate in local planning. 
That allowed official recognition of campesino and indigenous communities, 
acknowledged the territorial rights of these communities and bestowed them 
rights and obligations in local administration and development. It was the first 
time the government officially recognized these indigenous community 
organizations. Labor unions, however, were not considered for registration as 
OTBs, reflecting the determination of the government to prevent a legitimate 
role for organized labor.42  
 
Municipalities, some of them newly created, were through the LPP trusted with 
20 percent of the national budget to be spent in education, health, local roads 
among other areas. OTBs and oversight committees would assist with 
participatory planning, transparency and implementation. Accessing municipal 
funds were subject to the development of an annual operating plan (Plan Anual 
Operativo) which was to ensure that they were spent properly. Developing the 
annual operating plan required a new set of human resources and capacities 
lacking in many rural indigenous communities. As Postero shows, complying 
with these new requirements subjected the indigenous to the discourses of 
bureaucratic rationality and economic responsibility characteristic of neoliberal 
notions of citizenship.43 NGOs took on the task of training indigenous people to 
develop the capacities needed to comply with these requirements, often acting as 
private consultancies for municipalities in economic planning and reporting. 
This vastly increased the role of NGOs in development and made economic 
development the responsibility of locals, including the indigenous.  
 
Another piece of legislation, the National Agrarian Reform Service Law (INRA) 
introduced land allocation according to territories and provided protection for 
                                                          
40   Republica de Bolivia, Ley de Participacion Popular, Ley 1551, April 20th, 1994, pp. 1.  
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campesino and indigenous landholding. It was another legal recognition of 
indigenous social and cultural organization. This opened for formal landholding 
according to indigenous categories such as the ayllu. The ayllu is a social 
organization in the Andean areas, which incorporates land use, social 
organization and indigenous technology.44 Including social and cultural 
organizations in the land reform was a break from the revolutionary land reform 
of 1953 which distributed land as individual plots. These laws and others in the 
Plan for Everyone were in line with a predominant discourse on the multi-
cultural society which has gradually influenced the political agenda of many 
Latin American states over the past two decades.45 They stressed the cultural 
aspect of existing social organizations and their incorporation in the state’s 
administrative system. Social integration proceeded by recognizing and 
politicizing formerly excluded groups on the basis of their indigenous identity. 
Enabling indigenous people to gain positions in local administration has to a 
certain degree allowed them increasing acceptance from former mestizo and 
white elites in rural areas.  
 
During a revisit to Potosi in April 2000, it was evident that the reforms had 
encouraged a process of indigenous inclusion, despite persisting tensions. 
Indigenous communities had taken advantage of the reforms to become better 
organized. The village council, for example, had established governance at the 
community level (male) villagers had participated in sub-commissions, like the 
commission created for taking care of electricity and representing the village 
towards state administration and, more recently, the municipality. Historically, 
village councils had filled the role of absent state administration in many rural 
areas. It was only during popular participation and decentralization reforms of 
the 1990s that state administration reached these areas. Urban elites still showed 
a somewhat racist attitude towards villagers, but there were also aspects in 
which this was starting to change. According to the Aymara Indian and mayor of 
Uncía, north of Potosí, one of the first indigenous to be elected as mayor after 
the decentralization and popular participation reforms: 
 
“So many years have passed where the people from the rural areas have been 
discriminated by the people from the urban areas. They do not really respect 
us, they even say: ‘How can an Indian be a mayor!’ When I was about to 
begin there was strong opposition. People said: ‘Instead of being a town, 
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[Uncía] will transform into a village’. But with all that we are doing we are 
breaking this pattern. We also try to make the inter-cultural aspect respected 
at all levels. In all of the country we have always been marginalized, but it is 
interesting to note that the Indian and the campesino have the same capacity 
as the city-dweller, we are the same, but still the people of the urban areas do 
not accept this” (Interview, Uncía, April 2000). 
 
Another visit to Potosi in December 2006 made it apparent that indigenous 
integration had advanced. To the astonishment of many members of local elites, 
the indigenous had managed to claim power in the new municipalities rather 
effectively and become participants in the municipal democratization process. 
According to the director of one NGO working in Southern Bolivia, “Popular 
participation has allowed the reconstruction of indigenous organisations” 
(interview). This reconstruction has a strong element of cultural identity, since 
social organization and cultural identity are closely knit together in the Andean 
areas.46 
 
The shift towards identity based integration through the Plan for Everyone came 
at the expense of class based integration and labor unions. The Law of 
Capitalization that privatized state-owned enterprises in order to attract FDI 
fragmented the formerly powerful unions in the industrial sector. Many workers 
were made redundant, and the law did not have provisions for monitoring that 
the workers in private companies had the right to organize in unions. In 
interviews with social movement activists and labor organizers in La Paz, 
Cochabamba and Santa Cruz it became evident that many former union workers 
who had become unemployed had instead organized in other civil society 
organizations that agitated for basic rights and necessities. In turn, the Plan 
directly weakened union organization and class articulation of popular 
mobilization. Decentralization shifted integration discourses from a corporatist 
and class basis to a project of integration based on indigenous identity. 
Localizing governance weakened the corporatist interest mediation that had 
allowed the COB significant influence. Interest mediation and struggles have 
been shifted from the national economic arena towards political institutions at 
the local scale.  
 
Identity politics have been progressive in many respects, and have allowed a 
greater democratization of Bolivian society. But they can also be seen as in line 
with “constructive” neoliberal discourses, in which the recognition of 
indigenous identity is a way of integrating broad groups of society without 
making significant concessions to struggles for economic redistribution or 
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empowering labor unions. In this discourse, poverty is not primarily a question 
of skewed economic distribution, but of lack of capacities among citizens to 
participate economically and politically.  
 
   
Indigenous mobilization and political unrest 
The attempt to integrate indigenous citizens and capacitate their organizations to 
participate in political life had unintended effects. Indigenous integration 
policies not only subjected the indigenous to “authorized” forms of participation 
and mobilization, but also strengthened their organizational fabric and enabled 
them to constitute a political force at the national level. Indigenous organizations 
had demanded integration, and once achieved, they built their organizations, 
associations and alliances. In places like El Alto, which were to become the 
epicenters of oppositional mobilization, organizations sanctioned by the LPP 
proved to be mechanisms for indigenous resistance. In the words of Postero, 
“indigenous citizens, assuming some of the rationalities of neoliberalism and 
acting through institutions established during the neoliberal political reforms, 
posed important challenges to the workings of global capitalism.”47 While 
stopping short of challenging global capitalism, popular mobilization grounded 
in indigenous organization contested central elements of neoliberal reforms. The 
assumption that weakening labor unions while integrating and capacitating 
indigenous organizations would foster political stability turned out to be 
premature.   
 
Even by Bolivian standards, the period between 2000 and 2003 was marked by 
significant social unrest and tension. The 2000 Cochabamba “Water War” and 
the 2003 “Gas War” caught international headlines and the enthusiastic attention 
of an anti-globalization movement at its peak of mobilization. Protesters 
routinely identified “neoliberalism” as the root of most of the country’s 
difficulties.48 During the “Water War”, social movements mobilized against the 
privatization of the municipal water supply, and demanded greater recognition 
for indigenous “usos y costumbres” (costumary uses) in water management.49 
Despite calling in military to Cochabamba, the President Hugo Banzer had to 
concede to protesters demands and reversed the privatization. In 2003, La Paz 
and El Alto twice convulsed in popular uprisings. In February, unrest followed a 
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government proposal pushed by the IMF to increase taxes in order to deal with 
public deficits, and in October, El Alto was the centre of country-wide protests 
against a plan to export gas through Chile.50 In both incidents of 2003, protesters 
were killed. In many ways, these events illustrate the strengthened capacity of 
indigenous social movements and the complex relation between social 
integration and political mobilization.  
 
The character of political mobilization in this period can to a certain extent be 
traced to the rearticulation of politics that “constructive” neoliberalism had 
contributed to. The social movements that led the protests were composed partly 
of labor unions, but predominantly of other types of organizations that 
articulated demands on the basis of indigenousness. During the Water War and 
Gas War it was largely social movements, with a strong element of indigenous 
protesters and forms of organization, that were the backbone of popular 
mobilization. In interviews, social movement organizers agreed that the COB 
“did not have a dominant presence” and “was not a big part of what happened in 
2003” (interviews, Lopez, Vargas). It was to a significant degree indigenous 
organizations that challenged privatization schemes and gas export schemes that 
were considered too favorable to foreign companies. This was emphasized by 
Ramiro Delgado, Unit Leader of the Vice-ministry for coordination of social 
movements and civil society under the Morales government: 
 
“[The Water War] showed a new horizon for social movements… The Water 
War was the first step, when the social movements rearticulated. [The 
workers] started to follow social organizations, and they understood that in 
the country they weren’t only workers. There was an Andean world, people of 
the fields, of the different types of organizations, and that ‘the people of the 
fields’ have a different way to organize and adapt to the system… There are 
other sectors involved. There are the indigenous ‘originario’ pueblos, there 
are the campesinos, there are the juntas vecinales, and also workers. [These 
new social movements] don’t think only as a worker, but also they have 
another dimension, which is also the ethno-cultural [dimension] of the 
campesino, the ‘originario’” (interview).  
 
Neoliberal reforms had largely succeeded in weakening the organizational fabric 
of labor unions and the articulation of a class based opposition. Yet reforms on 
decentralization and popular participation had also provided new political spaces 
for strengthening identity based organizations, which were to a significant 
degree used to challenge the stability that the IMF assumed would come as a 
result. The political instability of the 2000 to 2003 period, in particular, 
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dispelled any illusion that weakening organized labor would impede popular 
mobilization.  
 
IMF officials were present in La Paz as the violence of October 2003 broke out, 
and later issued a statement saying that the IMF “regretted the tragic events in 
Bolivia”.51 The unrest also convinced the IMF that continuing ambitious reforms 
would be impossible without making some concessions to popular demand, 
since unrest impaired the ability of the government to implement reforms and 
damaged the potential for economic growth.  
 
 
Neoliberalism, popular mobilization and mutual constraints 
It is evident in the documents obtained from the IMF Archives that the 
institution backtracked on planned reforms in order to focus on stabilizing the 
political situation in the country. The 2003 Article IV Consultation conceded 
that “the fragile political context remains the main challenge for maintaining 
solid macroeconomic policies”.52 Popular unrest was seen as the single biggest 
threat to the implementation of the economic reform program and the 
attractiveness of the country to foreign investors.  While earlier documents had 
seen integration, consensus-building and the climate for investments as 
intricately interrelated, after the 2003 crisis it was increasingly admitted that 
there was tension between the aim to promote an attractive environment for 
foreign investment on one hand, and addressing the concerns of large segments 
of the population on the other.53 Looking back on its own policies from the 
1990s, it was acknowledged by the IMF that the Capitalization program had 
been too generous towards foreign investors, and that this had sparked popular 
protests that in turn damaged the investment climate. Institutional reform had 
not succeeded in breaking the grip that elites and vested interests had on public 
resources, which was also a contributing factor to social unrest and the situation 
of crisis. In other words, it was conceded that it was too much reliance on 
“reductive” neoliberal policies of privatization and not enough reliance on 
“constructive” neoliberal policies of consensus-building and integration of 
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marginalized sectors that had precipitated popular mobilization and unrest 
between 2000 and 2003.  
 
In looking ahead, the IMF stressed the need to balance the demands of social 
movements and maintaining favorable conditions for investors in the gas sector. 
Political consensus and medium-term stability was more important than 
economic “orthodoxy”, so the IMF accepted increased social spending, a greater 
role for the state and that economic policy would have to be based on 
compromised with popular demands.54 The 2003 Stand-By Arrangement with 
the IMF focused on counteracting the political and financial stability caused by 
popular unrest following the previous IMF-sanctioned program, and allowed 
increased social spending to maintain the weak consensus that had been reached 
with the opposition inside and outside of Congress, in order to “[lay] the basis 
for a return to growth”. It also accepted the need for greater taxation of foreign 
companies in the sector.55  
 
In 2005, the IMF held that the “passage of a viable hydrocarbons bill and 
maintaining a general framework conducive to foreign investment are critical to 
maintaining medium-term stability”.56 “Viable” in this context would be one that 
was acceptable to social movements. The IMF opened for a gas bill that 
diverged from economic “orthodoxy” and “reductive” neoliberal policies in 
order to foster political stability and consensus.  The same year the New Law of 
Hydrocarbons, Law No. 3058, was passed, with the (unenthusiastic) approval of 
the IMF. The law reversed, to a certain extent, the privatizations of the Plan de 
Todos, by increasing corporate taxes and rebuilding the state enterprise YPFB. 
According to the IMF Country Representative, both the Fund and private 
companies were willing to accept higher tax rates in order to create stability and 
a proper climate for investments in the longer run. “[In the case of Bolivia,] a 
better investment climate could mean increased taxes” (interview, Vesperoni).  
 
This illustrates the way in which popular mobilization and neoliberal reform are 
mutually influenced. Above we showed how social movements were, on one 
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hand, shaped by neoliberal policies that had encouraged a rearticulation of 
politics from a class discourse to a discourse of indigenous identity. On the other 
hand, by being committed to preserving the political stability necessary to foster 
a proper investment climate, the IMF was also convinced to shift its discourse 
and accept divergence from neoliberal “orthodoxy”.  
 
 
The Morales government and neoliberal constraints 
The election of President Evo Morales in late 2005 further strengthened political 
articulation on the basis of indigenous identity. Morales is the first indigenous 
President of the country, which now declares itself “multicultural” and 
“plurinational”. Indigenous groups that were significantly empowered through 
the neoliberal decentralization and participation reforms of the 1990s constitute 
the main constituency of his administration, and much to the dismay of the white 
and mestizo elites, his political rhetoric caters to this constituency. At his 
inauguration ceremony, Morales stated:  
 
“The indigenous people have been marginalised with the foundation of 
Bolivia in 1825, therefore the indigenous people will now claim the right to 
recreate Bolivia.” 
 
The Morales government implemented land reform in order to redistribute large 
land holdings to indigenous farmers, and favor further recognition of indigenous 
rights in a rewritten constitution. The Morales government has also 
institutionalized the contact with social movements, through a Vice Ministry of 
Coordination with Social Movements and Civil Society at the Presidential 
Palace in La Paz. This office serves as an interlocutor between social 
movements and the government, where representatives from social movements 
come to voice their demands. “Constant dialogue” with social movements is 
central to the government’s attempt to construct “a new public politics” 
(interview, Delgado). However, relations with labor unions are far more 
apprehensive. Many labor union leaders do not consider gas nationalization as 
conducted in a way that caters to their interests (interviews). They had 
envisioned nationalization that would restore the employment regime of the pre-
Capitalization era.  
 
Nationalization of gas resources was, as it was implemented, largely a Supreme 
Decree that activated the Hydrocarbon bill from 2005, to which the IMF had 
already consented. It continues actively seeking foreign investment in the sector, 
though with a higher tax intake than the pre-nationalization policy. The 
publication of nationalization was publicized as “recuperation the ownership of 
all the hydrocarbons produced in the country” [Decreto Supremo 2870], can be 
considered a concession to social movement demand. Foreign companies and 
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investment climate concerns are still elements of policy under the Morales 
government. Although Bolivia has no program obligations under the IMF, the 
Fund still performs its Article IV consultations, annual evaluations of the 
Bolivian economy, which acts as a “gatekeeper” for FDI and bilateral aid. In an 
interview, the Minster of Finance in the Morales administration said that: “The 
relation we have with the IMF, we don’t have any loans or agreements, but we 
keep a close relationship because we understand that many donors still trust on 
the IMF reports” (interview, Arce). Even for the Morales administration, a 
decent relationship with the IMF is maintained in order to attract investments to 
the “nationalized” gas sector.  
 
Conversely, the IMF has circumvented depreciatory evaluations of the Morales’ 
economic policy. The 2006 Article IV Consultation lauded the accomplishment 
of macroeconomic stability and the expansion of the hydrocarbon sector.57 It 
acknowledges that the recommendations of the IMF contained in the 2003 
Article IV Consultation have been partly implemented. Although it expresses 
some concern for the climate for investments, it considers the macroeconomic 
policies of the Morales government as “prudent”, and is cautiously optimistic 
about the prospects of poverty and inequality reduction.  
 
The Morales Presidency is a result of popular mobilization around the issues of 
gas and rejection of neoliberal privatization, and has as such been interpreted as 
a radical break from the policies of neoliberalism. Yet there are significant 
grounds for considering the ways in which the relation between the mobilization 
of Morales’ constituency and neoliberal policy discourses are interlinked and 
mutually constrained. There are important continuities between the 
“constructive” neoliberal reforms that provided spaces for the identity based 
mobilization which brought Morales to power and the concessions made by the 
IMF in order to preserve the political stability necessary for a proper investment 
climate. Morales has maintained the cultural identity based articulation of 
popular mobilization, at the expense of class based articulations. The IMF, on its 
part, has largely accepted higher corporate taxes and a greater role for the state 
to avoid further popular unrest.  
 
 
Conclusion 
By way of reconsidering the narrative of a Bolivian backlash against 
neoliberalism, we have presented an alternative narrative of the relation between 
popular mobilization and neoliberal reform. Instead of understanding popular 
mobilization as simply reacting to or as precipitating radical breaks from 
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neoliberal policy, we have instead focused on continuities and the ways in which 
they are mutually influenced and constrained. Highlighting constructions of 
citizenship and democratic participation, an emerging literature on neoliberalism 
has sought to analyze it as a “constructive” project which aims to create 
particular types of institutions and social infrastructures to improve the climate 
for investment. The contribution of this paper to this literature has been to 
investigate further how “constructive” neoliberalism creates spaces for certain 
forms of popular mobilization, particularly identity based forms of organization 
at the expense of class based ones. We have attempted to show some of the 
continuities and mutual constraints between, on one hand, social movement that 
achieved formal power, and on the other, neoliberal policymaking committed to 
maintaining the political stability necessary for a proper investment climate.  
 
In brief, our narrative has proceeded as follows. During era after the 1952 
revolution, the indigenous were attempted integrated as “workers” rather than as 
“indigenous” in the class based political discourse centered on the powerful 
labor federation the COB. As a result, large sections of the indigenous 
population suffered continued marginalization. Throughout the 1970s and 1980, 
increased indigenous mobilization demanded improved rights and gained formal 
positions within the COB. From the mid-1990s, “constructive” neoliberal 
policies replaced the class based political discourse with an integration regime 
that sought to integrate the indigenous based on their indigenous identities. This 
was both a result of indigenous mobilization and the “constructive” neoliberal 
rationale of creating the social infrastructure and political stability. Identity 
based integration provided political spaces for further mobilization of 
indigenous groups, which challenged some of the more “reductive” of the 
neoliberal policies, particularly privatization of the natural resources of water 
and gas. Popular unrest, particularly in the period between 2000 and 2003, 
convinced the IMF to make concessions and accept higher corporate taxation 
and a greater role for the state in the gas sector to preserve the political stability 
necessary for a favorable investment climate. Indigenous social movements 
were the backbone of the mobilization that brought Morales to power. The 
Morales government has strengthened the politization of indigenous identity and 
culture at the expense of class, which is in certain ways a continuation of the 
“constructive” neoliberal integration project of the 1990s. “Nationalization” of 
gas was a careful compromise between popular demand and the need to attract 
foreign investment, so policymaking is still constrained by the investment 
climate discourse of the IMF. 
 
The Bolivian case illustrates the continuities and mutual constraints in the 
relation between popular mobilization and neoliberal reform. Popular 
mobilization emerges not only as a simple reaction to dispossession, but also 
through new political spaces opened by these reforms. “Constructive” neoliberal 
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policy has provided spaces for particular forms of mobilization by politicizing 
cultural identity at the expense of class. This mobilization in turn forced the IMF 
to allow a greater role for the state and higher corporate taxation, illustrating the 
way popular mobilization also constrained policy. The continuities and mutual 
constraints between popular mobilization and neoliberal discourses in Bolivia 
show that relations between popular mobilization and neoliberal policy are more 
complex than what is most often suggested.  
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